Manmohan Singh’s government recently survived a critical vote of confidence in the Indian parliament over its support of the US-Indian agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Though the win was rather marginal, by 275 votes to 256, New Delhi and Washington are now ready to consummate their nuclear pact.
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Before talking about its impact, let us first congratulate India for securing the deal. After all, all countries are entitled to nuclear technologies. There is no doubt that all states should be entitled to civilian nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. And, in an anarchic world consisting of sovereign states, all state members are equally entitled to independent defense options, including the nuclear choice.
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Some might disagree with this for the sake of nonproliferation. However, being entitled to the rights while being encouraged to relinquish them voluntarily is different from simply denying such rights for the benefit of nonproliferation.
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One can opt for nonproliferation but cannot impose any security notion upon others. True, nuclear proliferation might incite regional instability, but the counter-argument could also be made that proliferation might have stabilized international relations already. For instance, the US-Soviet balance of power, or balance of (nuclear) terror, virtually stabilized their relations for nearly half a century. It is beyond comprehension how the USSR could have handled America without a nuclear balancer. It looked quite impossible and unreasonable that the then Soviet Union would be able to cope with America without nukes, just for the moral and security responsibility of nonproliferation.
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Similar argument can be made for China. Beijing developed its nuclear needs when it was potentially threatened by American nukes. But it would be ridiculous if all of the permanent five members of the Security Council (P5) could ban other states from following suit, especially when some of them might issue a nuclear threat again, while they have acquired nuclear weapons for their own respective national security,
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Such tactics of nonproliferation have not succeeded for Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Nonproliferation couldn’t stop them from acquiring nukes. To bring them back from nuclear militarization, it is important to transform their security perception to such a degree that nuclear weapons are no longer necessary to state security. Regrettably, even the P5 states have not attained this understanding.
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In this vein, India’s nuclear pursuit is unstoppable and cannot be reversed. America launched the Baruch Plan of Atoms for Peace, but failed to prevent India from going nuclear militarily. The Clinton administration attempted to "cap, freeze, and revert" India’s nuclear weapons program, but eventually realized such an aim was completely hopeless.
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Now, the Bush administration has claimed to advance nonproliferation by separating India’s civilian nuclear program from its military nuclear program, through cooperating with India on the civilian part. But, the White House is either being disingenuous and in fact doesn’t believe its own argument, or it could be being naïve, if it is earnest.
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America has to understand that India is equal to America in terms of sovereignty. India has a need for nuclear weapons just as America has. It is simply not possible to restrain India’s nuclear quest, civilian or military, through a civilian nuclear deal.
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It is India’s national consensus to be a nuclear power. It was the Congress Party that started India’s nuclear weapons program in the 1960’s. It was the BJP government that decided to test India’s nuclear bombs in 1998. While PM Singh concluded the nuclear agreement with America, he was firm to maintain India’s nuclear sovereignty for its military part. Though his government has been challenged by the confidence vote, his opponents have been even more aggressive in assuring that the US-India nuclear agreement shall not affect New Delhi’s nuclear arsenal and program in any way.
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There are no Indian politicians who want to make concessions to America on their military nuclear assets. The Bush administration is unlikely to restrain India’s nuclear weapons program in any significant way. It is clear that the Bush government needs an excuse to both tap India’s civilian nuclear market and shape its strategic inclination. PM Singh is also clever to tap this opportunity without yielding to America politically or substantially.
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Given that there are less than six months left before President Bush will step down, the Indian government has taken an emboldened step to push this nuclear deal forward. Presently, it is likely that the two capitals could finally complete the necessary legal procedures to install the act.
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However, this still doesn’t mean that the US-Indian nuclear deal could be implemented anytime soon. Two hurdles remain ahead. First, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has to agree with the United States�unilateral change of the nonproliferation code, in terms of the full-scope-safeguards requirement. No-one can guarantee that this will be secured. Second, if Barack Obama replaces George W. Bush, the Indians could feel disappointed, as the new US President may have no interests in executing this deal at all, just as Bush has had no interest in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.