Lately more military bluff has been uttered against Iran.
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On May 27, the Times online quoted a former assistant secretary of state of the U.S. that the Bush administration was planning to attack Iran in two months.
 That meant that America would strike Iran before August.
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On June 4, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert spoke during his U.S. tour that his country will take "all possible measures" to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program.  Two days later, his deputy, Shaul Mofaz, was quoted by the Yediot Aharonot as saying, "If Iran continues its nuclear weapons program, we will attack it." This deputy prime minister even thought that "there will be no alternatives but to attack Iran to stop the Iranian nuclear program."
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These are the latest coercions against Teheran from Washington and Tel Aviv. To be honest, it is always possible that the U.S. and/or Israel will attack Iran as they perceive the latter to carry on a threatening program of nuclear weaponry, detrimental to their vital security interests.
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Recent records also indicate that they would execute such an attack if they feel the threat imminent. For instance, the Bush administration launched preemption against Iraq in 2003, on the ground of Baghdad’s MWD development, though some insiders would argue Bush’s true intention was to "democratize" the Middle East, or to pursue a strategy of oil dominance.
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On the part of Israel, on September 6, 2007, the Israeli air force raided the suspected Al Kibar in Syria that was thought to be a reactor site. Prompted by the U.S. intelligence, the IAEA is asking for an inspection of the site, though this Vienna-based organization already thought it is too late to collect meaningful evidences such as nuclear radiation.
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But the theoretical possibility that the U.S. and/or Israel could strike Iran at any future time doesn’t necessarily mean that they must launch such an attack immediately. There are three variables involved when they make a decision.
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The first factor is if Iran is found guilty. Indeed, the United Nations Security Council has passed three sanctions resolutions from 2006 to the spring of this year, but the UN has not established that Iran is working on nuclear weapons.
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Even though the IAEA Board of Governors report (GOV/2008/15), issued on May 26, 2008, has toughened stance on "the alleged (Iranian) studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project", it has also concluded to "have been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran."
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The second factor is how serious the Iranian side has presented a security challenge to the U.S. or Israel. Certainly neither Washington nor Tel Aviv could accept a muslin bomb to emerge in the Gulf, but the aforementioned conclusions don’t indicate that Iran is going to acquire an atomic bomb anytime immediately. Given this, one can at most suggest that Iran has to shed more lights on those important security concerns, but the threat herein doesn’t seem imminent.
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In fact, the U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded in November 2007, in its latest National Intelligence Estimate concerning Iran, that Iran is highly likely to have ended its nuclear weapons program. Without re-establishing something otherwise, either by America or the IAEA, it is not logical to execute an attack without solid facts.
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Then, the third factor at issue is the cost of another preemption. Without sound evidences and international approval, a unilateral strike can lead to very unpredictable and even dire consequences, as demonstrated in the Iraq case over the past five years. Even more complicated than this is the timing. A Bush’s attack on Iran can bring serious damage to the already weak chance of Senator McCain’s to bid for the White House. It is unconceivable that Iran would not retaliate if it is stricken without being caught. Therefore, political opposition will arise from both aisles of the Congress.
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Apparently, Israel will not adventure such an attack without informing Washington and receiving its support. But this is not the good time that the U.S. is willing to risk a major confrontation, while its fight in Afghanistan and Iraq continues.
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All these calculations apply to Iran.  The leadership in Teheran does exactly the same bet as American and Israeli strategists do. That is why the Iranian leaders have shown contempt with the UN sanctions - as Iran is not convinced that an aggression is imminent, as long as it is trusted as not diverting its known nuclear operation for non-peaceful purposes. As the Iranian leaders believe in this, they can even push for uranium enrichment for fuel rod supply without fearing to invite a military response. Iran even has threatened not to cooperate with the IAEA inspection if this organization remains hostile.
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To wrap, military bluff is not effective at this stage. While Iran has to be careful not to push the envelope too much, the tension is still within control.
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(Shen Dingli is a professor of international relations of Fudan University. He is the Director of Center for American Studies, and Executive Dean of Institute of International Studies at Fudan. He holds a Ph.D. in physics.)