Given just nine months available before the Bush administration will be gone, Pyongyang has been hard pressed as to what it needs to get from the White House, as well as what it can trade with America.
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If there is no deal stricken before President Bush will step down, Pyongyang has to wait for another year at least to see the new administration in Washington to frame its own North Korean nuclear policy. Presumably the new boss at the White House will be preoccupied with forming his or her full team of national security, and in devising an overall national security strategy with his or her own fingerprint, deviating at least somewhat from Bush’s.
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Even in the best case, the new President will focus primarily on finessing Bush’s legacy on Iraq. If a democrat will be elected, he or she has to implement his or her vow to withdraw GIs from the battlefield as quickly as possible, no matter Senators Clinton or Obama can win. None of them will give the North Korea’s nuclear question with high priority.
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And if McCain is elected �given Clinton’s close and fierce infighting with Obama, McCain’s chance could only be amplified �he probably will not give Pyongyang a favorable treat as well, especially given the recently emerging case of a suspected Syrian facility where North Korea has been alleged to have a nuclear link.
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Therefore, the DPRK has not much time left to make a strategic decision in choosing a counterpart in America to negotiate with. Â If Pyongyang remains hesitant, it may face even worse situation later: without improving relations with American, there is little to check his tough North Korean policy of the President Lee Myung-bak and his government in Cheong Wa Dae.
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It is imperative the North Korea has to do something with America in the next half year, in order to shape the contour of America’s DPRK policy of even the next administration. However, the North has little to offer in this game, due to its security restrain and resources available.
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In fact, the Bush administration has already been under siege. Even though the neoconservatives have been less influential in America these days, they keep pressing the White House on the term to bargain with North Korea.  They demand a tough regime for a complete nuclear disablement and disarmament of North Korea. They also want to be totally free of threat from the alleged North’s uranium enrichment program, and they are asking for a clear explanation of the DPRK-Syria nuclear nexus.
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For the part of plutonium program, the reported 30 kg of plutonium that the DPRK has told the U.S. that it has possessed cannot suffice the expectation of the America’s worst case scenario. Actually due to the fundamental distrust between the two sides, the U.S. would not trust anything the DPRK will declare without a solid inspection regime.
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Then, for the alleged uranium enrichment program, the DPRK has officially never openly admitted to have acquired, of course privately Pyongyang may have admitted to America its existence, though not at industrial scale yet.
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For the DPRK-Syria nuclear connection, it is too early to claim that the Syrian side has had a clandestine nuclear program and Pyongyang has assisted Damascus to build a nuclear reactor. Much is in suspicion and certain international inspection seems warranted concerning the Israeli bombing of the northern Syrian facility near al-Kibar in September 2007. Nevertheless, Syria has seemed reluctant to sue Israel against its raid of this remote northern facility. It also seemed more concerned to clear the site and remove the restage before anyone else would arrive. These acts add to suspicion.
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Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill has been hard negotiating to bridge Washington’s differences with Pyongyang, but he may be unable to iron out the internal gap of positions amongst various branches of the U.S. government. He has been under attack for being too soft toward the North.
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Under the direction of Secretary of State Rice, he might be interested in striking a grand deal with Pyongyang in which the U.S. will be assured with high confidence that the North’s plutonium program will be fully accounted and disarmed, while Washington can take the cost of not resolving the uranium part of the problem immediately. But not all parts of his government will agree. The Syrian case has made his efforts more complicated. It is hard to imagine that even the Congress, now controlled by the democrats, will support Bush’s compromise without suspecting his purpose of strengthening his presidential legacies through making a deal before leaving the White House.
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Pyongyang has to present its statecraft in its nuclear gambit. It has to choose the timing of this take-and-give game, not to lose its opportunities while President Bush is still in charge. Certainly, to be more straightforward in settling the dispute over its declaration of plutonium stockpile is the immediate key. This can be assured as long as the DPRK will open its history of nuclear reactor operation, and will allow sufficient verification.
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(Shen Dingli is a professor of international relations of Fudan University. He is the Director of Center for American Studies, and Executive Dean of Institute of International Studies at Fudan. He holds a Ph.D. in physics.)