Since 2002, Iran’s nuclear issue has taken a central position in world focus for more than five years. This thorny issue has remained unresolved thus far.
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For less than one and half years, the United Nations Security Council has adopted three resolutions to sanction against Iran’s nuclear course - Resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006; Resolution 1747 on March 24, 2007; and Resolution 1803 on March 3, 2008. So far, Teheran has followed neither of them. Instead, Iran has voiced threat to sue some developed countries for their imposition of sanctions against Teheran.
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On April 16, Shanghai hosted a meeting for the Director Generals of respective Foreign Ministries of the U.S., Russia, Germany, U.K., France and China, with EU Council sending its own counterpart. As expected, this meeting has yielded nothing great to either entice or coerce Iran effectively. In fact, a week before this "six-party" talk of Iran-version, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had started installing 6,000 P2-version of centrifuges in Natanz for uranium enrichment, disregarding the most recent UNSC Resolution 1803.
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If Iran’s enrichment efforts are not reverted within three months, it is likely to face new sanctions this June or thereafter. Regrettably, one can predict quite comfortably that Iran will not observe UNSCR 1803, or the next few sanctions resolutions the UN Security Council would conceivably launch.
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What is wrong with all these? Iran’s resistance has a great deal to do with its interests and rights, and with the lack of right balance of incentives and disincentives of the world.
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The rights of Iran, as a sovereign state, include peaceful use of nuclear energy with full rights of fuel cycle of uranium enrichment and plutonium processing, as long as these are for civilian purposes, provided by international safeguards. In the meantime, even the military use of atomic energy is also within the sovereign realm of any states if they will not abandon such rights by joining NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.
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For instances, the U.S. nuclear weapons development has not been illegal �it raced with Nazi’s nuclear development for legitimate reason. Also, China’s acquisition and development of nuclear weapons is also not illegal �Beijing did so as a response to the U.S. nuclear bluff. China and the U.S. have joined NPT as nuclear weapons states, committing nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and its total disarmament eventually. But before all their nuclear weapons are gone, their possession of such weapons is not illegal.
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And, the NPT has never had a right to demand a country to join it. Any states would join the treaty only if they feel they gain more by relinquishing their rights of developing nuclear weapons. The treaty has been made in such a way that all member states can still quit after joining it, given supreme national security grounds and an advance notice of 180 days. North Korea did so in 2003 to regain its right, to our dismay.
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Therefore, Iran is entitled to civilian use of nuclear energy, especially when it has committed to abandoning its rights of developing nuclear bombs. The current international approach to stopping Iran’s uranium enrichment is questionable.
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Obviously Iran has engaged in unreported nuclear activities in the past that has tarnished its reputation. It has not yet totally cleared the nature and substances of such clandestine program in a complete and satisfactory fashion. The UN demand of suspending Iran’s enrichment program has its own justification.
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So far the IAEA and the U.S. intelligence have both concluded that the ongoing Iranian nuclear program is peaceful �one would also take the notice that the U.S. government concluded that prior to late 2003, the Iranian government had involved in nuclear weapons program against its own pledge.
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Given such complexity of the matter, the international community has neither defended Iran’s full rights of civilian nuclear development, since Iran has been proven innocent right now in nuclear nature, nor gathered enough disincentives to deter. All these sanctions resolutions are weak and members of international community are divided as to the ways and means in handling Iran.
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Iran’s true intention of nuclear development may be larger than what it has claimed. Its genuine interests may be to open all nuclear options, no matter civilian use for power generation or less peaceful end to hedge against uncertainties. This seems to best explain why Iran doesn’t want to lose control of an independent nuclear program with all possibilities for a future. This has a direct bearing on an independent defense and foreign policy for a nation.
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To foreclose Iran’s certain non-peaceful possibilities completely, the world would also deprive Iran’s certain legitimate peaceful rights. And, the world is unable to deliver enough pressures on Iran, because of Iran’s own legitimacy of civilian use of atomic energy even with independent fuel cycle, not to mention the only superpower is being mired in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Therefore a solution to break Iran’s nuclear impasse is to make it clear that Iran can go ahead with uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes, but it has to be assured as peaceful with close international monitoring, and truly strong international sanctions shall be evoked should there be a violation.
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(Shen Dingli is a professor of international relations of Fudan University. He is the Director of Center for American Studies, and Executive Dean of Institute of International Studies at Fudan. He holds a Ph.D. in physics.)