Drop "One Child" Policy, Scholars Urge

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Although any deviation from the "One-Child" policy is still expressly denied by the government, more and more scholars and policy researchers are calling for change and a revision to a "Two-Child" policy. Otherwise, they say, looming ahead is a demographic transformation unprecedented in human history that will see the rapid aging of China’s population and the shrinking of the population of the most populous country in the world. 

In fact China is now quietly implementing a "one child and a half" policy, meaning some families who qualify may have two children. For example, rural families with only a girl child are allowed to have a second child. But with strict implementation of the policy, China’s birth rate stands at only 1.47.

During the "Forum of China’s Population and Economic Development Under Low Birth Rate" held at Peking University on December 20, Zeng Yi, professor at the National School of Development, Peking University, said the coming five years offer an opportunity for the government to adjust the birth policy, and that it should gradually allow urban and rural women to have to children with the prerequisite of later childbirth for the first child (originally this was set at age 24 or later, but this time no age was mentioned) and a proper interval, perhaps several years, between first and second births. 

Mystery of Birth Rate

Chinese demographic scholars differ with officials on how low the birth rate actually is.  Comparing 11 statistics or estimations of China’s birth rate, including National Bureau of Statistics figures, Guo Zhigang, professor of the Department of Sociology, Peking University, calculates China’s real birth rate in late 1990s to be as low as 1.36 to 1.5. The National Population and Family Planning Commission （NPFPC� however, pegs it at 1.8 for the past 10 plus years. Though higher than Guo’s estimation, it is still lower than the 2.1 replacement rate.

The NPFPC insists on the 1.8 birth rate due mainly to the real possibility of underreporting in its investigation, but Guo says many factors support a lower birth rate. First, according to a nationwide population and family planning survey in 2006, women of childbearing age wanted ideally to have 1.73 children on average, but their desire to have more children was restrained by current policies. Second, between 1996 and 1999, as women tended to have children later then before, the birth rate dropped 0.23 on average. These factors, neglected in the past, coupled with sex identification, infertility, changes in the way of living, and increase in China’s huge floating population (the floating population birth rate is 1.19, significantly lower than that of non-floating population), all point to a birthrate lower than 1.8 and closer to Guo Zhigang’s estimation.

Were China to stick to its current policy, maintaining a low birth rate will further the inertia of negative population growth and trigger a series of severe social problems. 

Zeng Yi also thinks the current "one child and a half" policy is becoming increasingly harmful, so that both its short-term and long-term costs far exceed its gain.

First, it is producing a great many "high-risk families," with only one child. Natural disasters such as the Wenchuan earthquake can leave many families childless. The "4-2-1" family structure (four grandparents, two parents, one child) makes these families vulnerable to all manner of accidents.

It also leads to an imbalanced sex ratio, with more boys than girls. Boy to girl ratios in areas in which the "one child and a half" policy is in effect have reached 124.7:100. The policy, Zeng Yi says, is adding to sexual discrimination, while making it harder for men to find a wife. 

Third, the current policy will reduce China’s labor resource (aged 18 to 64) from 959 million in 2030 to 777 million in 2050. There will be fewer young adults while the proportion of old people above 65 will increase from 6.7% in 2000 to 27.8% in 2050. On average, 9.1 laborers now support the pension of one person above 65, but in 2050 one retiree will be supported by only 2.1 laborers.

Fourth, the current policy will exact high management costs and political expense. The government will have to spend 143.3 billion yuan annually to reward families with only one child, while in 2003, this number was 930 million yuan.
　　
According to Zeng Yi’s estimation, if the government gradually adapts the current "one child and a half" to a "two child" policy, China’s population will reach a peak at 1.48 billion in 2038, and then decline smoothly.

Zeng Yi and Gu Baochang, a professor at Renmin University in Beijing, revealed the results of pilot investigations of the "two child" policy in Jiuquan, Gansu Province, Yicheng, Shanxi Province, Chengde, Hebei Province, and Enshi, Hubei Province, showing that the population in these areas has maintained a low growth rate and no birth rate rebound or sex ratio imbalance has occurred.

Meanwhile, the "two child" policy also helps to expand internal demand and employment. More babies mean more workers able to work in 20 years, when China will be in a period of "demographic debt." These workers not only won’t add to employment pressure, they will in fact relieve pressure feom shrinking population and aging.

Zeng Yi suggests the government should declared there will be no reversion to "one child" when launching the "two child" policy to discourage people from bearing babies as soon as possible over worries about shifting policies. The government should also advocate later childbirth and a proper interval between each childbirth.
 
The next five years is a perfect chance to launch birth policy adjustment, Zeng Yi believes. Women aged 27 to 30 are most likely to have their second child, and the number of women in this age group hits a low between 2008 and 2013 but will reach a peak in 2018.