Ever since Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability, through nuclear explosion in 1998, the credibility of security of its nuclear arsenal has been queried by the West.  For America, it has been a perennial question if the state government in Islamabad can be in full charge of its nuclear arsenal.
The "911" attack has much exacerbated this concern. Washington was so worried about the security of Pak’s nuclear weaponry, for fear of loose control of the arsenal that will eventually be accessible by unauthorized personnel, including those in uniform but without proper authorization.
For a while after "911" attack, the U.S. government was talking about nuclear security and interested in understanding how Pakistan might have employed a system of personnel reliability and mechanical as well as electronic protection against unauthorized access to such weapons. Washington was concerned about security in all links of Pak’s control of nuclear weapons �in deployment, storage, or transportation. American nuclear weapons laboratories might also be keen in assuring that the equivalent of U.S. PALs (permissive action links) are installed in Pakistan’s system.
Pakistani military won’t feel respected in regard to American suspicion. Some might perceive the American nuclear chauvinism just because non-Caucasians might be more colored. The Indians had similar experiences as when they claimed success of nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, the U.S. gave less credit simply for the unusually low nuclear yield of the last test in the series �what Indians declared as a low-yield thermonuclear sort of blast.  Nuclear weapons designers at Los Alamos or Livermore thought this might be a partial failure. However, nuclear weapons experts of New Delhi resented Americans because of the "white-superiorism".
But the current concern over Pak is not completely without a justification. Recent leaks about Libya and Iran’s illegal access to uranium enrichment technology of Pakistan, as well as nuclear weapons design through A. Q. Khan, provided the reason of such query. Indeed it is hard to understand that the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb can operate an international nuclear black bazaar for years, without his government’s awareness or intervention.
The Pentagon has just stated that the U.S. is not concerned about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto’s death. But it shall be the Pentagon that is most concerned about this at this particular moment. The U.S. Department of Defense shall not be in a position to openly express its concern, discrediting American allies in Islamabad, for the sake of anti-terror. The U.S. shall also not encourage the terrorists for the chaos they brought about. When the underground nuclear market of A. Q. Khan was revealed in 2004, the U.S. government also didn’t openly look after him in order not to derail the support from Pakistani government.
At one point, the Pentagon was understood to have prepared for taking over the physical control of Pakistan’s military nuclear assets. It will not be a surprise if the American special operation forces are now fully ready to executive such mission. However, one has to act calmly while actually is pretty otherwise.
The true worry is the permeation into the government and military or intelligence institution, by the Islamic fundamentalists. To be honest, the anti-American religiously-based extremism has received quite some sympathy in that country. Even in the high hierarchy of the state, the military intelligence organs for instance, many officers disagree with the President for switching support from Taliban to America.
To be sure, as a de facto nuclear weapons state, Pakistan is the most unstable among all in the expanded nuclear club. One truly respect Pakistani government and armed forces for their possible ability to control situation and restore order quickly, but the international concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are legitimate as such worry is not totally unwarranted.
The turmoil in Pakistan requires the world to be more affirmative in curtailing the spread of those deadly weapons. Since the demise of the Cold War, in less than twenty years the world has witnessed the nuclear proliferation in South Asia, Northeast Asia and Middle East. India and Pakistan have moved their nuclear weapons from closet. Iraq and Libya one and again demonstrated the non-compliance of international treaty as state parties. Iran may possibly fall into this category for its covert nuclear program prior to 2003. The DPRK quitted NPT to develop nuclear weapons "legally", and it might have conducted such development even as a member of the treaty.
Given Pakistan’s current and foreseeable instability, the international community needs to extend its hands to help restore the social order and national reconciliation, even though it seems an insurmountable task. Safeguarding the nuclear weapons in Pakistan is not only the sovereignty of that country, but the responsibility of humankind.
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(Shen Dingli is a professor of international relations of Fudan University. He is the Director of Center for American Studies, and Executive Dean of Institute of International Studies at Fudan. He holds a Ph.D. in physics.)